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Abstract: Prevention of poverty and social exclusion is a process di-
rectly related to public incentives for vulnerable groups aiming to achieve a 
decent and independent life. Labour income is one of the main prerequisites 
for overcoming the problem. However, a large number of the working popula-
tion is economically inactive and do not even look for forms of employment. 
Low education levels, the lack of working habits and the limited demand for 
skilled labour are objective factors for this. The characteristics of the tax and 
social security system as well as the state policy with regard to income and 
the labour market towards vulnerable groups also affect the desire to work 
and employment opportunities.   
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nemployment is an objectively emerging situation for a person or 
group of individuals causing adverse effects – loss of income and 
deterioration of social status. Its high rates are an expression of in-
complete and inefficient use of labour resources and represent a serious social 
problem. For most people, job loss means lower income, poverty, and person-
al drama with multiple negative consequences. Unemployment leads to a re-
duction in aggregate production, household consumption contraction, loss of 
human capital, and deterioration of the social climate and public health. 
Therefore, control over and reduction of unemployment are some of the most 
important economic objectives pursued by government policies.   
                                                            
1 E-mail: K.Filipova@ue-varna.bg 
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Benefits paid to the unemployed provide income for jobless individu-
als as well as opportunities to bear the burden of risk collectively. At the same 
time, their generosity can affect both the incentives to find and start work and 
the duration of the unemployment period. The article studies the cases ‘for’ or 
‘against’ this form of social protection and examines how successful it is in 
Bulgaria. It covers the period from 2005 to 2017 and tries to analyze the situa-
tion before, during and after the economic crisis.   
The research problem of the study is unemployment benefits. The re-
search area is their impact as a form of social protection for the unemployed. 
The article aims to study the extent to which unemployment benefits play the 
role of a social safety net and, on this basis, to offer suggestions for their op-
timization.  
 
 
Debate on unemployment benefits in economic literature  
 
Unemployment benefits are an example of short-term government in-
tervention affecting the working population outside the labour market. In the 
context of social security, this intervention includes protection against disrup-
tion or loss of income during the period of incapacity (the International Labor 
Organization, 2010) and prevention of poverty. At the same time, according 
to some authors (Scheve, Slaughter, 2004), financial security applies only to 
those who have the opportunity to work. Presented in that way, job insecurity 
and the right to benefits include considerations other than the possibility of 
losing your job (Anderson, Pontusson, 2007).  
Positioning the risk of unemployment is important for potential unem-
ployment compensation beneficiaries. According to some authors, it is a me-
diating factor in the relationship between risk group membership and attitudes 
towards the welfare state (Blomberg et al., 2012). Thus, instead of making 
assumptions about workers’ security and insecurity, objective conditions of 
employment are taken into account. Individual security perceptions may vary, 
yet those who occupy an objectively secure position may also experience un-
certainty.  
However, employment insecurity is positively associated with the 
support for government redistribution of resources and collective social secu-
rity. Workers’ attitudes towards unemployment benefits in society depend on 
the level of job insecurity. Employees with unstable employment and those 
occupying non-permanent positions are more likely to support social protec-
tion schemes and unemployment benefits (Anderson, Pontusson, 2007, Bur-
goon, Dekker, 2010, Margalit, 2014, Marx, 2014) than the workers who do 
not expect labour imbalances. Therefore, it can be assumed that potential ben-
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eficiaries of the public social system are interested in two main factors: the 
level of employment protection and the generosity of unemployment benefits. 
Public unemployment insurance can motivate subjectively secure and inse-
cure workers in different ways thus polarizing or uniting the support for these 
benefits.  
The fact that workers occupying insecure positions are more motivated 
to support public unemployment benefits while the rest are less subject to 
such agreements reflects the polarization of preferences and the conflicts of 
interest between the two groups (Paskov, Koster, 2014, p. 368). This dispute 
is a proven fact in literature, although it is not fully recognized that unem-
ployment benefits are adequate to the economic cycle and provide adequate 
prevention of poverty.  
Numerous analyses focus on how social security beneficiaries respond 
to the increase in benefits. Back in the 1980s, it was suggested that the factors 
playing a key role in explaining the duration of unemployment and its rate at a 
state level are the alternative cost of rest time, job search intensity and wage 
costs. It was concluded that the effect the extension of benefits has on the du-
ration of unemployment is ambiguous (Mortensen, 1977).  
At the same time, other researchers find a positive relationship be-
tween the duration of unemployment and the higher level of benefits. A po-
tential stimulating effect of unemployment insurance, thoroughly analyzed in 
literature, is that their level may reduce the intensity of job search by unem-
ployed workers since the financial urgency to find work is reduced. The mod-
el implies that the incentive effect works in a way that unemployment insur-
ance is more harmful to job search incentives (Mitman, Rabinovich, 2014). 
This argues the increase in generosity of benefits when unemployment is 
high, contrary to the idea discussed above. A study for Sweden draws the hy-
pothesis suggesting that the more generous benefits result in a longer period 
of unemployment and even a higher unemployment rate (Carling et al., 1996). 
According to data for Austria, the increase in benefits causes a significant 
increase in state unemployment rate (Lavile et al., 2006).  
A third group of studies indicates that job search varies depending on 
the overall unemployment rate. The generosity effect in the standard model2 
results from the assumption that the unemployed look for less suitable job 
vacancies when unemployment rate is high. This suggests that the deterrent 
effect of benefits3 is small when unemployment is high and big when unem-
                                                            
2 The standard model appeals to lower generosity of benefits in case of high 
unemployment rate. 
3 Although the days when unemployment benefits are received are not equivalent to 
the duration and the equivalence of the working days, public benefits for this insured social 
risk have a deterrent effect. It finds expression in the conscious participation of beneficiaries 
in the passive labour market policies. As a result, the public mechanism should coordinate its 
measures to limit the long-term and/ or frequent beneficiaries of this state incentive.  
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ployment rate is low (Andersen, Svarer, 2010). Attempts have been made to 
analyze business cycle dependencies. The unemployment insurance scheme in 
Germany extends the duration of benefits for older unemployed workers. A 
study, using this special feature to analyze how the extension of benefits af-
fects the duration of unemployment periods, determines that motivating long-
term effects are consistent throughout the different business cycles (Schmied-
er et al., 2012). Whether the result will be the same if extension of benefits is 
applied to all unemployed, however, is unknown.  
 
 
Standpoint of the scientific field on unemployment benefits  
in the poverty risk prevention  
 
Risks of unemployment and poverty are two of the major challenges 
faced by current global economy. The first one results in reduced purchasing 
power among the working population. This, in turn, leads to the risk of pov-
erty and an increase in the debt burden for vulnerable people. It is important, 
therefore, to define them in order to facilitate the methods for their prevention.  
The XXI century began with major changes and they inevitably affect-
ed the indicators under consideration. Globalization transforms trade, invest-
ment and technology. It also creates an economic interdependence and vul-
nerability to economic shocks and downturns among the population. If fair 
public policies do not exist, countries may experience an increasing burden of 
unemployment and poverty risks. In order to be adopted more smoothly, the 
new wave of globalization requires better government.  This suggests that its 
benefits are shared by everyone, rather than by a small group of people. Ex-
pectations are that poverty reduction will increase demand and productivity 
globally. Thus, reducing unemployment and social exclusion cannot only al-
leviate human suffering but can also play a key role in maintaining stable 
economic growth and well-functioning markets (Ortiz, 2007, p. 7).  
At the same time, the labour market is still recovering within the EU. 
Phrases such as high levels of poverty, social exclusion, unemployment, in-
come inequality and low average wages are common. According to some au-
thors (Mojsoska-Blazevski, N., M., Petreski, D., Petreska, 2013, p.9) ‘tradi-
tional’ social assistance and insurance measures can only be effective if they 
are purposefully distributed. In all other cases, they create obstacles to active 
job searching and starting work.  
To evaluate the effect of benefits, some authors are reviewing the re-
sults of the Lisbon Agenda for growth, employment and social inclusion. 
They draw a balance with a view to the Europe 2020 Strategy’s goal to help 
20 million people live beyond the poverty line. “The question arises why, de-
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spite the increase in average incomes and employment, poverty rates have not 
decreased but stagnated or even increased” (Cantillon, 2011, p.432). In her 
study, Bea Cantillon draws the following conclusions: the increase in em-
ployment has affected only part of the unemployed households; the protection 
of income at the time of termination of employment for the working-age pop-
ulation has become less adequate for vulnerable groups of people; social poli-
cies and, more generally, social redistribution cover most of the poor and vul-
nerable individuals. These observations are indicative of the Lisbon Strategy’s 
ambiguity.   
Therefore, unemployment benefits can also be considered as automatic 
stabilizers. Some authors (Blagoycheva, 2014) describe their manifestation as 
a contribution towards smoothing the aggregate shocks on the labour market. 
It is important to note that these regulators have only a short-term effect, and 
they cannot be relied on in the long run. They can lead to unsustainable levels 
of government spending and taxation in the event of lasting supply shocks. 
The term ‘automatic stabilizer’ implies elements embedded in the design of 
the fiscal system, which automatically cause a budget deficit during a reces-
sion (due to reduced employment) and budget surpluses during an inflationary 
boom (due to low unemployment) without changing the economic policy 
(Ivanov, Marinov, 1992, p.11). Surpluses lead to an improvement in the 
budget position, but the effects of the recession reflect in a fiscal deficit. 
Therefore, it is crucial that automatic stabilizers act so that public finances are 
able to absorb these changes.  
However, embedded automatic stabilizers can only mitigate recession-
ary or inflationary shocks, i.e. they cannot eliminate them. The effectiveness 
of their effect depends to a large extent on how widespread is the system of 
social transfers, unemployment benefits and the extent to which state inter-
vention in social and health insurance is strong. Equally important are the 
number of floors in the income tax scale and the tax rates. Alternatively, the 
greater state intervention in the economy, the stronger influence of the em-
bedded stabilizers.  
An important precondition for well-functioning automatic counter-
cyclical stabilizers is the pursuit of a reasonable fiscal policy that ensures con-
solidation under conditions of economic growth to create absorption capacity 
in bad times. This requires the public sector to provide a buffer to mitigate the 
effects of fluctuations in the economic cycle for particular private individuals.  
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Unemployment benefits in Bulgaria  
 
The formation of mechanisms and the policy of distributing unem-
ployment benefits is a major challenge for any modern state institution in the 
light of the intentions to reduce poverty. Bulgaria makes no exception being a 
full member of the EU and in view of the forthcoming entry into the euro ar-
ea. In this context, it is appropriate to assess to what extent unemployment 
benefits in the country act as automatic stabilizers.  
In the context of the global financial and economic crisis, the combi-
nation of high relative percentage of uninsured persons and low-income re-
placement rates of some groups strengthens the social effects of the rising 
unemployment in Bulgaria. At the same time, they lead to a reduction in secu-
rity and contribute to the overall risk perception among the working popula-
tion. Hence, a further reduction in aggregate demand deepens the crisis.  
A problem remains with the inability to give an account of the actual 
number of the unemployed accurately, as some of them are not registered with 
employment services as active jobseekers. As stated in the Joint Employment 
Report of 2017, there are still large variations in the number of registered in-
dividuals within Member States. This imbalance depends on various factors, 
such as the capacity of public employment services, the quality of the services 
offered, the sanction mechanisms, and the obligations related to unemploy-
ment benefits and other income support schemes. 
Back in 2010, some authors (Terziev, 2010) highlighted the problem 
that while the European Union supported the annual leave entitlement as a 
human right, Bulgaria revived the idea that it could be initiated by employers. 
Although the country is part of a single whole, there is a contrast between two 
socio-economic schools – the European and the Bulgarian. A typical example 
is the days of involuntary unpaid annual leave4 in the public sector. On the 
one hand, the probable causes are the accumulated unused days of paid annual 
leave in the public sector and the fact that they are provisioned, i.e. the money 
paid are cleared from the budget. On the other hand, there is a shortage of 
fiscal resources due to the ambition to save state funds. This is an anti-crisis 
                                                            
4 According to the Labour Code (LC): § 3e. (New - SG 58/2010, in force as of 
30.07.2010) (1) Up to 31st of December 2010, when work volume is reduced, employers may 
grant unpaid leave of up to 60 working days during the calendar year to employees without 
their consent, provided that during the unpaid leave, employment measures funded by the 
Republican budget and/or the Human Resources Development Operational Programme are 
taken, and part-time work hours are previously introduced under Art.138a, para.1 and §3b, 
para.1. During this period, employment measures funded by the Republican budget and/or the 
Human Resources Development Operational Programme should also be taken.  
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measure and, when imposed, it is necessary to cover the prerequisites5 prom-
ulgated, adopted and presented in the Labor Code cumulatively. It is im-
portant to note that law in the field of labour relations defines the days of in-
voluntary unpaid leave or reduced working time as a period of contributory 
service taken into account when calculating the duration and the amount of 
the unemployment benefits paid to employees in the public and/or private 
sector. Nevertheless, uncertainty and insecurity of the macroeconomic envi-
ronment are intensifying. As a result, this leads to risks for both potential un-
employed and the social security system as a whole.  
Hence, another important thing for the country’s population is whether 
the public sector, alongside the dynamically changing economic situation, is 
able to provide the necessary income support to the unemployed and to pro-
tect them from poverty. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of unemployment bene-
fits in Bulgaria in the years of economic growth and in the post-crisis period.  
In the pre-crisis period from 2005 to 2007, the number of unemployed 
persons entitled to compensation decreased from 77.7 thousand to 65.1 thou-
sand. At the same time, the average monthly amount of the benefit gradually 
increases from 97.31 (2005) to 206.90 BGN (2017). During the period from 
2005 to 2013, there was a 3.49-fold increase in the total amount of the bene-
fits. In view of the fact that the variation of the indicators mentioned in Figure 
1 is relatively close, the presence of automatic stabilizers can be assumed.  
Inversely, average monthly compensation increased after 2008. In 
2011, it was 257.80 BGN or 33.85% higher than in 2010.6 In 2014, despite 
the continued increase in both the total amount of funds granted and the 
average amount of benefits, the number of persons entitled to unemployment 
benefits decreased.  
The highest growth rate of registered unemployed persons entitled to 
unemployment benefits was reported in 2010 compared to the previous 2009. 
It amounted to 13.06%. This trend continued in 2012, but at a slower pace. 
                                                            
5 The prerequisites are as follows: a) employers have already used the possibility of 
introducing part-time work hours under art.138a, para1 of the Labour Code /employees have 
to sign an order/;   
b) employers must have already used the possibility of introducing part-time work 
hours under §3b, para.1 of the Labour Code /an order has to be signed by employees/;  
c) during the unpaid leave it is necessary to take employment measures funded by 
the Republican budget and/or the Human Resources Development Operational Programme 
(i.e. employees must participate in the process – for example they have to take part in a 
qualification training course).  
6 The significant increase in the unemployment benefit amount is due to the changes 
in legislation introduced as of 1 July 2010. They abolish the limitation on the maximum 
unemployment benefit setting it to 60% of the person’s insurance income before losing their 
jobs.  
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The growth rate amounted to 10.41% compared to 2011. Between 2013 and 
2017, there was a trend towards a reduction in the number of persons eligible 
to unemployment benefits entitlement. This indicates that in 2017 unemploy-
ment rate in Bulgaria was lower as compared to the previous nine years. Data 
in Figure 1 show that its values were close to those reported in the years of 
economic growth. 
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*
Unemployment benefits (thous. BGN) 101.58 112.11 121.27 141.39 238.25 311.16 320.03 354.32 351.26 339.47 338.09 339.4 288.5
Average monthly amounts of unemployment
benefits (BGN) 97.31 106.13 110.59 136.98 164.20 197.31 250.27 253.19 254.15 264.16 306.22 353.32 206.90
Registered enemployed persons entitled to
unemployment benefit (in thousand ) 77.7 70 65.1 67.5 121 136.8 106.6 117.7 116.5 92.4 92 92 81.56
Figure 1. Dynamics of unemployment benefits and registered persons 
entitled to public financial assistance 
 
Key: R – Revised data on registered unemployed persons in 2011  
  * – Preliminary data  
Source: Statistical bulletins of NSSI (for the respective years) for registered unem-
ployed persons entitled to monetary compensation and Eurostat data  
 
At first sight, results support the idea that the increase in generosity of 
benefits not always leads to an increase in the number of people willing to 
receive them. In fact, the situation is not exactly the same as beneficiaries of 
the insurance system represent only a small part of the unemployed (Figure 
2). The rest are young people who are not insured or are new to the labour 
market and do not have the labour service needed to be entitled to benefits. 
Long-term unemployed for whom the period of receiving income support 
from the system has already ended also represent a large group.    
By the early 2008, there was a gradual convergence in the number of 
persons receiving benefits and those not entitled to compensation. Logically, 
during the crisis and the period of recovery after it (2010-2014), there was a 
significant difference between the two indicators due to considerable job cuts. 
Since 2013, the total number of registered unemployed persons has started to 
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decline and the number of employed individuals has risen. The proportion of 
persons in the two categories equals, with a higher percentage of those not 
entitled to unemployment benefits (NSI, 2018).  
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Figure 2. Beneficiaries of unemployment benefits in Bulgaria before  
and after the crisis 
             
Key: R – Revised data 
Source: Statistical bulletins of NSSI and main results for NSI workforce monitoring. 
 
However, when assessing the appropriateness of unemployment bene-
fits paid, it is also necessary to estimate the financial burden they impose on 
society. Quite logically, the level of the cost of unemployment benefits de-
pends on the number of unemployed persons entitled to benefit, the legislative 
changes during the period studied, and the average monthly amounts of the 
monetary benefits paid. Table 1 summarizes the information on the allocation 
of funds for the 2005-2017 period.  
The amount of 91,147.20 BGN paid for monetary unemployment ben-
efits in 2005 increased to 394,100 BGN in 2017, or 4.32 times. Conditionally, 
this 13-year period can be divided into two sub-periods following the trend 
established in accordance with the unemployment rate.    
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Table 1 
Financial indicators for the allocation of financial resources under the 
Unemployment Fund for the period 2005 – 2017 
 
Year 
Total cost of 
compensation 
and 
unemployment 
benefits  
(thous. BGN) 
Total revenues 
and transfers to 
the 
Unemployment 
Fund (thous. 
BGN) 
Deficit (-) or 
surplus (+) 
(thous. 
BGN) 
Number of 
persons 
entitled to 
unemployment 
benefit 
Average 
monthly 
monetary 
benefit 
(BGN) 
2005 91 147,2 304 154,9 213 007,70 78 052 97,31 
2006 89 163,7 277 917,4 188 753,70 70 014 106,13 
2007 86 352,7 326 369,2 240 016,50 65 072 110,59 
2008 99 689,4 160 271,0 60 581,60 60 645 136,98 
2009 238 487,0 168 968,0 - 69 519,00 121 034 164,2 
2010 311 361,2 159 570,0 -151 791,20 131 500 197,31 
2011 320 445,8 170 426,0 -150 019,80 106 804 250,27 
2012 354 885,2 178 970,0 -175 915,20 115 327 253,19 
2013 351 727,8 198 376,0 -153 351,80 107 312 254,15 
2014 340 176,4 211 187,0 -128 989,40 92 249 264,16 
2015 338 982,7 227 840,0 -111 142,70 91 979 306,22 
2016 389 971,9 221 901,6 -168 070,30 92 114 353,22 
2017 394 100 est. 529 600,0 est. -135 500 est. 81 857* 206,90* 
Key: est. – Reported data 
: – Data not available 
* – Preliminary data as of November 2017 inclusive 
Source: NSSI and Eurostat 
 
During the first sub-period (2005-2007), the cost of compensation and 
unemployment benefits decreased in each subsequent year, with a total de-
crease of 4794.5 BGN or 5.26%. The second sub-period (2009-2017) illus-
trates a reverse trend. In 2009, the reported expenditure increased by slightly 
more than twice as compared to 2008. From 99 689.40 BGN in 2008, the 
amount paid reached 238 487 BGN (2009). In the coming years until the end 
of 2012, there was a steady increase in the cost of unemployment benefits. 
The total increase amounted to 116,398.2 BGN or 48.81%. During three years 
of the analyzed period, the level of expenditure decreased slightly by 1% (in 
2013 by 3 157.4 BGN less than in 2012 and in 2015 by 1 193.7 BGN as com-
pared to 2014), and by 2% (in 2014 by 6 956.1 BGN less as compared to 
2013). The amount of the average monthly monetary benefit has the most 
significant impact on the cost of monetary unemployment benefits. For the 
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entire thirteen-year period, it has grown almost 3.63 times – from 97, 31 BGN 
in 2005 to 353, 22 BGN in 2016. According to data, up to November 2017, 
the amount decreased by 70.72% as compared to the previous 2016.   
Table 1 shows that since 2009 a budget deficit has been formed in the 
Unemployment Fund (Figure 3). The reasons for its formation are complex 
and bound to a significant extent by the economic crisis that occurred at that 
time. One of the reasons for this is the reduction in the number of jobs and the 
decrease in the wages of a large number of workers during the crisis, which 
results in less income from social security contributions. Another reason is the 
lack of a more drastic increase in the minimum insurance income. Finally – 
the increased mass of unemployed people in need of benefits. However, the 
Fund’s deficit results in a hampered fiscal policy and the need for more sub-
stantial redistribution of the GDP realized in the country.  
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Figure 3. Unemployment Fund budget balance for the 2005-2017 period 
 
In the period after 2012, there was an emerging trend of deficit reduc-
tion. However, despite the economic recovery in recent years and the rising 
employment rate, a new serious increase was reported in 2016. Table 1 shows 
that in 2016 the Fund revenues were by 168,070.30 BGN less than the ex-
penses. The reason for the increased deficit can be the increased average un-
employment benefit (from 306.22 BGN for 2015 to 353.32 BGN in 2016)7. 
This increase is in fact a counterbalance to the functioning of benefits as em-
bedded budget stabilizers due to its formation in a period of economic recov-
ery. A similar situation may slow down job search and lead to stronger reli-
ance on social security support. This is an unfavorable situation for society 
causing greater redistribution of the realized GDP.  
                                                            
7 In Bulgaria, in view of the decreasing relative share of persons entitled to 
unemployment benefits among the working population as of November 2017 inclusive, the 
average amount of the benefit drops to 206.90 BGN.  
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Increasing budget deficits force public officials to consider options for 
reducing costs and/or increasing taxes. Many governments, including the Bul-
garian, are forced to economize state resources by reducing the scope of their 
services. This includes a reduction in wages in the public sector through re-
strictive measures, such as involuntary unpaid annual leave or job cuts.  
The final result is that recession seriously affects the quantity and 
quality of government services provided to citizens. Despite the good fore-
casts of analysts and the revival of the economy in recent years, Bulgaria’s 
fiscal position is still not balanced. This will continue to keep the majority of 
the population trapped in unemployment, low incomes and risk of poverty.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although EU countries have different social policies, they are all 
unanimous with regard to the need to provide protection and mediation in 
finding employment for people at working age. Generated security extends 
over both their professional and family lives. It becomes active under condi-
tions of employment and after falling out of the labour market. It is possible to 
achieve this due to the benefits received since they allow people to meet in-
creased costs with relative ease.  
Based on the study, it can be concluded that the longer the period of 
incapacity is in combination with guaranteed financial benefits, the more in-
dividuals are discouraged for active job search and participation in the labour 
market. A similar situation makes it difficult to meet the objectives of a num-
ber of national and international documents aimed at increasing employment 
in the EU even after the global economic crisis.   
Obviously, unemployment benefits in Bulgaria perform an important 
social function, substituting income and providing a minimum standard of 
living for those entitled to receive them. Thus, they provide a certain degree 
of protection against poverty. Benefits are also intended to be used as stabi-
lizers. However, when performing that function, they have a weak effect, as 
their impact can only be spread out to a limited number of the unemployed.  
Further reforms are needed to facilitate the substitution between in-
come smoothing and incentives for job search. Unemployment architecture 
consists of a certain number of elements that could facilitate this substitution. 
These are, for example, the level and time profile of compensation replace-
ment rates or the introduction of adequate activation policies aimed at expand-
ing job search efforts. Further efforts are also needed to increase the flexibility 
of the labour market in order to neutralize the negative economic impacts in 
the long run.  
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Finding the optimal balance between the policies creating incentives 
for the unemployed, the economically inactive and the low-wage earners is 
one of the key challenges for ensuring sustainability and efficiency of the so-
cial system. At the same time, it is possible to create conditions for involving 
some of the most vulnerable social groups in long-term participation in the 
labour market.  
Each of the above-mentioned options, as well as various combinations 
thereof, would help to remove unemployment traps and create incentives for 
workers to return to work faster. Otherwise, the Bulgarian economy (hence 
the tax and social security system) will continue to lose by the long-term un-
employed who take advantage of the existing system and are in no hurry to 
get back to work.  
The confidence that vocational education and training is a key factor 
for sustainable socio-economic development of the country is growing. Train-
ing of human resources with qualifications corresponding to the needs of the 
national economy requires new approaches in the field of vocational educa-
tion and training. It is necessary to improve the education system and to mod-
ernize the base so that it can contribute to increasing employment and social 
integration. Well-developed public social policies act as a safety net contrib-
uting to fight against poverty and social exclusion, support active population 
in their efforts to return to work, encourage self-sufficiency, and provide ade-
quate support for vulnerable people.  
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